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NOTES
PROMISSORY OBLIGATIONS BASED ON PAST BENEFITS
OR OTHER MORAL CONSIDERATION

I
The currently popular criticism' of the doctrine of consideration can find few
more vulnerable points than that rule which holds that past benefit 2 or the
xLord Wright, Ought the Doctrine of Consideration To Be Abolished from the Common
Law, 49 Harv. L. Rev. 1225 (x936); Report of the English Law Revision Committee, The
Statute of Frauds and the Doctrine of Consideration, 15 Canadian Bar Rev. 585 (r937) (Sixth
Interim Report of the Committee); M. P. Sharp, Notes on Contract Problems and Comparative Law, 3 Univ. Chi. L. Rev. 277 (x936); Shattuck, Gratuitous Promises-A New Writ?,
35 Mich. L. Rev. 9o8 (1937); Some Aspects of the Law of Gratuitous Promises in Illinois,
5 Univ. Chi. L. Rev. 464 (1938).

2Benefit will be used in this discussion in the sense given it in the Restatement of Restitution. "A person confers a benefit upon another if he gives to the other possession of or some
other interest in money, land, chattels, or choses in action, performs services beneficial to or
at the request of the other, satisfies a debt or a duty of the other, or in any way adds to the
other's security or advantage ..... The word 'benefit,' therefore, denotes any form of advantage," Rest., Restitution § i, comment b (1937).

NOTES
moral obligation arising from its receipt is insufficient consideration to support a
promise. This aspect of the consideration doctrine works a great hardship in the
cases where one, not intending it as a gratuity, confers a benefit on another
without the previous request necessary to make it a valid consideration3 or
without satisfying the exacting conditions precedent to recovery in quasicontract.4 The impossibility of creating an enforceable legal obligation in this
situation,S even though the person benefited manifests by a subsequent promise
his intention to be legally obligated to pay for the benefits,6 is in striking contrast to the treatment accorded similar cases in the civil law. There a promise
may be supported by a "natural obligation" arising from the past receipt of a
benefit.7 Moreover a person who performs a service by managing the business
of another, 8 even without any authorization, may recover the value of his
services under the doctrine of negotiorum gestio.9
The refusal of most American courts to enforce the subsequent promise of
the person benefited necessarily leads to a lowering of standards of responsibility. It is contrary to a layman's notions of good morals.o It impairs the
freedom of contract. Criticism of this refusal finds support in history, for prior
3Lampleigh

v. Brathwaite, Hob.

1o5

(K.B. 1616). The readiness of the courts to make an

exception to the past consideration rule whenever there has been a previous request, without
insisting, as did justice Holmes in Moore v. Elmer, r8o Mass. iS, 61 N.E. 259 (19oi), that there
be a clear understanding that the benefit was to be paid for, indicates the disfavor with which
the courts have regarded the past consideration rule.
4

These conditions are so numerous that relief is afforded in only a few cases. Cf. Wood-

ward, Quasi-Contracts 308-14 (1913).
s Generally legal sanctions would be unnecessary to compel performance of a promise which
the promisor made solely because he felt himself morally obliged to do so. But where, as in
Webb v. McGowin, 27 Ala. App. 82, i68 So. 196 (1936), noted in 31 Ill. L. Rev. 39 o (1936),
the promisor has died, only a legally enforceable obligation could help the promisee. The same
necessity exists where bankruptcy or legal incapacity of the promisor intervenes.
6 It is an anomaly that the courts will even violate the express intent of the parties in order
to prevent unjust enrichment resulting from the enforcement of forfeiture provisions in a con-

tract, yet in the aforementioned cases they refuse to give effect to the express intent of the
parties which would prevent unjust enrichment.
7

7 Planiol et Ripert, Trait6 pratique de droit civil frangais, pt. 11-Obligations §992 (1931)

(part II, avec le concours de Esmein, Radouant, et Gabolde), translated in Rheinstein, Cases
and Other Materials on the Comparative Law of Contracts i 9 (mimeo. ed. 1939) (contains a
valuable collection of continental cases on this problem).
8"The affair carried on might be of any sort, the act being either material, as the procurement of medical and hospital treatment, or juristic, as the paying of a debt," Negotiorum
Gestio in Louisiana, 7 Tulane L. Rev. 253, 255 (1933).
9Lorenzen, Negotiorum Gestio in the Civil Law, 13 Cornell L. Q. 19o (1928); Tulane L.

Rev., op. cit. supra note 8.
xoSee F. C.Sharp, Ethics of Breach of Contract, 45 Int'l J. of Ethics 27 (i934) (indicates
what an important role our notions of good morals play in the law of contracts).
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to Slade's Case, there did not have to be a present consideration, a past debt
2
being sufficient to support a subsequent express promise to pay.'
Statutory reform to remedy this defect has been suggested by the English
Law Revision Committee,13 which advocated the complete abolition of the rule
that past consideration is no consideration.14 An analysis of the theories of contract and quasi-contract, suggests, however, that the consequences of this defect
may be avoided without statutory revision. Recovery in quasi-contract for a
benefit conferred with a non-gratuitous intent could be granted with a minimum
of judicial extension of currently accepted legal principles, for these principles
afford an ample basis for meeting the objections on which the courts at present
base their refusal to allow quasi-contractual recovery. A further alternative to
statutory reform in those cases where there has been a subsequent promise to
pay for the benefit is recovery in contract, on the basis that such promise is
supported by the moral obligation arising from the receipt of a past benefit. In
Illinois there already exists authority for this position. Added support for the
contention that a subsequent promise to pay for material benefits should be
enforced is to be found in the commercial cases where the courts have greatly
liberalized the requirements of the doctrine of consideration in order to make a
promisor bear the risk of reliance on the promise.
II
The objections to allowing quasi-contractual recovery for benefits conferred
non-gratuitously are, first, the officious nature of the act of conferring a benefit
and, second, in the emergency cases, where the objection of officiousness fails, the
conclusive presumption of the gratuitous nature of the service.'5 The basis of
the objection of officiousness is the undesirability of allowing one to force himself
on another as his creditor.' 6 As Bowen, L.J., said in Falcke v. Scottish Imperial
Ins. Co., "liabilities are not to be forced upon people behind their backs ..... ,,-7
It would seem, then, that if the person benefited manifested his consent to become an obligor, such action should be treated as removing this objection as a
bar to recovery in quasi-contract. A subsequent promise to pay the person who
has conferred a benefit is clearly sufficient evidence of such consent. Hence, the
xx4 Coke *92b (K.B.
X2Sidenham

1602).

v. Worlington, 2 Leon.

224 (C.P. I585); 1 Williston, Contracts § 143 (rev. ed.
1936).
X3Report of the English Law Revision Committee, op. cit. supra note 1.
14 Report of the English Law Revision Committee, op. cit. supra note x, at
32.
xs Hope, Officiousness, 15 Cornell L.Q. 25, 205 (1929); Woodward, Quasi-Contracts 314
(1913).

x69 ....

A person should not be required to become an obligor unless he so desires," Rest.,

Restitution § 2 (X937). Hope, op. cit. supra note x5, suggests that originally the objection of
officiousness was based partially on the notions of the service being non-beneficial and unnecessary, but concludes that these elements have been forgotten.
17 34 Ch. D. 234, 248 (C.A. 1886).
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making of a: subsequent promise should result in the imposition of quasi-contractual liability, provided that the receipt of the benefit constitutes enrich8
ment, and its retention is unjust because it was not conferred gratuitously.'
The most common instances of past benefit are the improvement of another's
land, the rendering of some service, or the payment of another's debt. Where
the benefit rendered consists of improvements upon land the Illinois courts refuse to allow recovery in quasi-contractwhether the improvement was made as
a result of mistake or with full knowledge of all the facts.x9 In denying restitution to one who has improved land by mistake the courts rely, not on the doctrine of officiousness, but on the closely analogous "policy which protects the
owner of land against paying for improvements which he does not want or for
This policy, however, hardly seems to justify the dewhich he cannot pay.
nial of relief when the owner has indicated by a subsequent promise of compensation that he wants the improvements and that he has the ability to pay for
them. Rather a subsequent promise should remove the bar to recovery both
when the improvements were made by mistake and when made voluntarily
with the expectation of being paid. The case for relief is particularly strong
when the improvements were made as a result of a mistake. At present the
courts grant restitution where an owner has remained silent knowing that the
improvements were being made. 21 His silence serves as consent. Since there is
just as clear a case of unjust enrichment when he fails to learn of the improvements until after their completion, restitution should be granted, if he gives his
consent when he discovers that they have already been made.
Furthermore, the courts have recognized the equitable duty of an owner seeking relief in equity to compensate one who improved his land as the result of an
honest mistake. 22 The Illinois Supreme Court has stated that quasi-contractual
relief should be granted "where one received money or its equivalent under such
120

circumstances that in equity and good conscience he ought not to retain it."

3

It follows then that when the reason for the denial of restitution has been removed by a subsequent promise, restitution should be granted in an independent action to the person who made the improvements in all those cases where
the courts have recognized the equitable duty of reimbursement.24
XSCf. 14 Canadian Bar Rev. 758 (1936).
9Dart v. Hercules, 57 Ill. 446 (I87O); Maynard v. Stevens, 370 Ill. 594, ig N.E. (2d) 575
(x939) (unless there has been compliance with the Ejectment Act, Ill. Rev. Stat, (i939) c. 45,
§§ 53-59); cf. Williams v. Vanderbilt, 145 II. 238, 34 N.E. 476 (1893); see Wakefield v. Van
Tassel, 218 Ill. 572, 75 N.E. io58 (i905).
2o Rest., Restitution § 2, comment a (i937).

"Olin v. Reinecke, 336 Ill. 53o, 168 N.E. 676

(1929).

"Lagger v. Mutual Union Loan Ass'n, 146 IH. 283, 33 N.E. 946 (1893); Ebelmesser v.
Ebelmesser, 99 Ill. 541 (i88i); see Wakefield v. Van Tassel, 218 IlM. 572, 75 N.E. io58 (rgo5).
"2HighwayCom'rs v. Bloomington, 253 Ill. z64, 174, 97 N.E. 280, 284 (1912).
24The right to maintain an independent action for restitution for improvements made by
mistake has been upheld in Bright v. Boyd, Fed. Cas. No. 1875 (C.C. Me. 1841), and in Hardy
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Ia the cases where one renders some unrequested service to another, recovery
in quasi-contract is again conditioned upon the removal of the objection of
officiousness. The view, here contended for, that a subsequent promise will be
sufficient to overcome this objection has been expressly approved by a dictum
in an Illinois appellate court decision. The court, although denying recovery
because of the usual objection of officiousness, stated that quasi-contractual
relief would have been allowed, if there had been a subsequent promise to pay
2
that which "in equity and good conscience ought to be paid.'' 5
Adoption of the proposed principles should meet with little opposition where
the benefit consists of payment of the debt of another. At present "a person
who officiously pays the debt of another may be entitled to recover the amount
of such payment if the other affirms the payment. '' 6 The reason for allowing
recovery is, of course, the fact that the subsequent affirmation removes the objection of officiousness. The recognition in these cases of the right to recovery
when the bar to liability has been removed is a very persuasive precedent for
similar treatment of the cases where the benefit takes some other form.
When a person confers a benefit on another by saving his life or property in
an emergency, the courts cannot rely on officiousness as an objection to granting
quasi-contractual relief, but they will refuse recovery on the ground that there
7
was no unjust enrichment because the benefit was gratuitously conferred.2
The gratuitous nature of the act is, it is said, conclusively presumed when not
done by one in his professional capacity.25 It is submitted that this presumption
is undesirable, and that it is inconsistent with general legal principles.
In the usual emergency case the service is rendered under circumstances
which demand immediate action. The impossibility of deliberation prevents the
formation of an intention either to render the service gratuitously or for corn-

v. Burroughs, 251 Mich. 578, 580, 232 N.W. 2oo, 201 (1930). In the latter case the court
pointed out that "the fact that the defendants need no relief, and therefore seek none, ought
not to bar the plaintiffs right to relief in equity."
/15See Illinois T. R. v. Cleveland, C., C. & St. L. R., 157 Ill. App. 102 (r920).
26Rest., Restitution § 112, comment c (1937); Graves v. Harwood, 9 Barb. Ch. (N.Y.)
477 (185o); Maryland Casualty Co. v. Givens, 177 Ky. 131, 197 S.W. 497 (I17); see Neely v.
Jones, i6 W. Va. 625 (i88o); Kenan v. Holloway, i6 Ala. 53 (I849). Cf. 3 Page, Contracts
§ 1520 (1920).

For an interesting discussion of this problem arising when a bank pays a check after receiving a stop payment order see Recovery by Drawer against Bank for Payment of Check in
Violation of Stop Payment Order, 45 Yale L. J. 1134 (1936); Recovery by Bank Paying Instrument after Stop Notice, 4o Harv. L. Rev. zo (1926).
27 Hope, op. cit. supra note iS. It is interesting to contrast the state of the law in Germany.
There even though one renders services gratuitously, if there is a change in circumstances removing the reason for the gratuitous intention, the courts will enforce a promise to pay for the
services made after the change in circumstances, Reichsgericht (VI) 199o, S. v. W., 72 RGZ
i88, reprinted in Rheinstein, op. cit. supra note 7, at 26.
28 Hope, op. cit. supra note i5; Woodward, Quasi-Contracts §§ 199, 201 (1913).
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pensation.29 Since no real intention exists, in establishing the presumption of
intention the courts should be guided by the same principles that govern
similar situations in other branches of the law. The application of the principal
rule relied on by the courts in the construction of wills, when confronted with
the analogous problem of ascribing to a testator an intention relating to a contingency which it is clear the testator never considered, would preclude a presumption of a gratuitous intent. This rule is to ascribe to the testator an intention which a reasonable man would have formed had he been faced with the
necessity of making a choice.3° Inasmuch as it is more normal, human nature
being what it is, to want to receive value for value given than it is to expect no
return for benefits conferred,31 it seems probable that in the majority of cases, a
reasonable man would intend to receive compensation for his services.32 This is
particularly true when the person undergoes financial loss or physical injury in
rendering the service.
If the courts did adopt this rule of law regarding intention, it would be expedient to limit relief to the cases where the person rescued subsequently
promised to reimburse his rescuer. The acceptance of the promise would serve
to corroborate the presumption of non-gratuitous intention. It would furnish
some evidence of the reasonable value of the services. Finally, the requirement
of a subsequent promise would provide a method by which one could limit his
quasi-contractual liability to those cases where there was a real emergency.
No one can gainsay the justice of allowing quasi-contractual recovery to one
who has suffered physical injury or financial loss in saving another from danger.
Such a policy would place the loss on the one who caused it. It would reward
meritorious acts of intervention. Furthermore, it would be consistent with the
decisions in the "rescue" cases allowing the rescuer to recover (on the theory
33
that "danger invites rescue") from the party who created the emergency.
Inasmuch as the courts will compel a third person who has created a danger
inviting rescue to reimburse the rescuer, they should give legal effect to the
attempts of a person rescued from a danger he himself created 34 to place himself
under a legal obligation to compensate his rescuer.3 s Furthermore, the theory
29Of course, the circumstances also prevent the making of a contract. In view of the fact
that the impossibility of making a contract regarding special services in non-emergency cases
has moved the courts to grant quasi-contractual recovery for the value of the services (CravenEllis v. Canons Ltd., [1936] 2 K.B. 4o3, discussed in i4 Canadian Bar Rev. 758 (1936)), the
impossibility here should serve as an additional reason for granting restitution.
30 Rheinstein, Law of Inheritance 147 (1938); Rest., Property § 243 (Tent. Draft 1937).
3' Cf. Hope, op. cit. supra note 15 at 37, n. 35.
32 We do not, of course, suggest that the reasonable man would require a promise of com-

pensation as a condition precedent to his rescue attempt.
33 Eckert v. Long Island R., 43 N.Y. 502 (1871); Wagner v. Int'l R.,
N.E. 437

(1921);

Laufer v. Shapiro,

232

N.Y. 176, 133

App. Div. 436, 2o6 N.Y. Supp. 189 (1924).
Ala. App. 82, 168 So. 196 (1936).
21o

Cf. Webb v. McGowin, 27
35It might be contended that the logical extension of these rescue cases would justify the
imposition of tort liability on one who negligently created his own danger when that danger
leads to the injury of a rescuer.
34

THE UNIVERSITY OF CHICAGO LAW REVIEW

that "danger invites rescue" would justify the implication of a request for assistance, thereby bringing these cases within the rule that a requested benefit is
good consideration for a subsequent promise.
The principles proposed would make possible the granting of quasi-contractual relief, both in the emergency and non-emergency cases. The requirement of a subsequent promise would be in itself an efficient protection against
their abuse. Such a requirement would prevent anyone from forcing himself on
another as his creditor and would allow one to avoid paying for an unwanted
benefit. Furthermore, it would be an adequate safeguard to subject to careful
scrutiny the circumstances under which the subsequent promise is made and to
deny restitution when there is any suspicion that the promise was a product of
duress or mistake. What dangers of abuse remain are clearly outweighed by the
justice and social desirability of allowing one to place himself under a legal
obligation to make reimbursement for benefits received.
III
A
As an alternative to quasi-contractual relief, the courts of Illinois could grant
relief in contract. No Illinois decision exists which would preclude the enforcement of a subsequent promise supported by the moral obligation arising from
the previous receipt of a benefit. There are a number of Illinois cases stating,
sometimes strongly, the widely accepted rule that moral obligation is good consideration only when it arises from a previously existing legal obligation barred
by operation of a rule of law. None of these cases, however, is conclusive on the
sufficiency of moral obligation arising from a past benefit because they are
merely dicta on the point. In none of the cases was there a moral obligation
arising from the receipt of a past benefit, either because there was no past
benefit,36 or because the benefit was conferred gratuitously, 37 or because the
benefit had already been paid for,38 or because the benefit did not move from
the promisee and, thus, no moral obligation was owed to the promisee.39 Of
course, it might be contended that even though the statements of the limited
rule of moral consideration are dicta, they would prevent the Illinois Supreme
Court from recognizing a more liberal doctrine. It was, however, in the face of
equally strong dicta stating the narrow rule that Wisconsin4o recently recog36 Kirkpatrick v. Taylor, 43 Ill. 207 (1867); Hart v. Strong, 183 111.349, 55 N.E.
Schwerdt v. Schwerdt, 235 Ill. 386, 85 N.E. 613 (1908).

629 (1899);

37 Williams v. Forbes, 114 Ill. 167, 28 N.E. 463 (i885); Strayer v. Dickerson, 205 Ill. 257,
68 N.E. 767 (19o3); French v. Green, 225 Ill. 304, 8o N.E. 318 (1907); People v. Porter, 287
Ill. 401, 123 N.E. 59 (gi9).
38 Plowman v. Indian Refining Co., 2o F. Supp. 1 (I11. 1937).
39
40

Hobbs v. Griefenhagen, 91 Ill. App. 4oo (r899), aff'd 194 Ill. 73, 62 N.E. 308 (z9o).
Park Falls State Bank v. Fordyce, 2o6 Wis. 628, 238 N.W. 516 (1931).
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nized the sufficiency of the moral obligation arising from any past receipt of
benefit.
To counteract the persuasiveness of these dicta, there are two cases, neither
of which has been overruled, in which the Illinois Supreme Court unequivocally
declared its adherence to a less limited rule of moral obligation as sufficient consideration to support a promise. In Spear v. Griffith,4' A conveyed land to his
son for a consideration based on an estimate of the quantity of land. In fact
there was less land than estimated. The court said A's subsequent promise to
pay for any deficiency in the land was supported by the moral obligation to do
so. In Lawrence v. Oglesby,42 a son, the chief beneficiary under his father's will,
promised the latter on his deathbed that he would pay his sister $1500 that the
father had promised to pay her. The court enforced the promise on the ground
it was supported by consideration in the form of the very broad moral obligation
of the father to provide for the daughter. The force of the court's recognition of'
this broad moral obligation as good consideration is weakened by its alternative
holding that the father's leaving his will unchanged was a "full and sufficient
consideration for the promise."43 The court so held although it was dearly not
a bargained-for consideration. The explanation of the court's willingness to rely
on these alternative grounds, both of which lack general recognition, is the fact
that the action was framed in assumpsit, thereby precluding the enforcement of
a constructive trust, the normal theory of relief in this situation.44
In view of the agreement of the authorities on the validity of the doctrine of
moral consideration when limited to the cases where it arises from a former legal
obligation subsequently barred,45 or when there was an unsuccessful attempt to
create a legal obligation,46 the slight further step to its recognition in all cases
where there has been a past benefit could be negotiated without difficulty. The
reason compelling such a step is the fact that in every case where one receives a
material benefit which was not gratuitously conferred, the moral obligation to
pay for it is the same whether there was once a legal obligation subsequently
barred, or an unsuccessful attempt to create a legal obligation, or no previous
legal obligation at all.47 Since the moral obligation is sufficient consideration in
4186 Ill. 552 (1877).
42

178 IM.

122, 52

N.W. 945 (1899).

43 Ibid.

at 129.
Bogert, Trusts and Trustees § 499 and cases cited in § 499, n. 20 (1935); People v.
Schaefer, 266 Il. 334, 107 N.E. 617 (1914).
45 See cases cited in notes 33-6 supra. Contra: Bank of New Boston v. Livingston, 182
Ill. App. 529 (1913). This decision, in which the court refused to enforce a promise by the heirs
to pay a claim against an estate which had been barred by operation of law, appears to be the
only Illinois case which has departed from the general rule.
46 See Morse v. Crate, 43 I. App. 513 (1892); Barnes v. Hedley, 2 Taunt. 183 (C.P. 1809).
44 3

47 Ferguson v. Harris, 39 S.C. 323,
87, at 88, n. (c) (i8io).

27

S.E. 782 (1893); Comstock v. Smith, 7 Johns. (N.Y.)
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the first two situations, it should be similarly regarded where there was no
previous legal obligation at all. It was this observation that recently moved the
Supreme Court of Wisconsin, in a decision approving corporate directors' performance of a moral obligation, to extend the doctrine of moral consideration to
every moral obligation arising from the past receipt of a benefit.48 Illinois
should have even less difficulty in extending the doctrine than did Wisconsin,
because, although like Wisconsin it must disregard some dicta limiting the doctrine, it has, unlike Wisconsin, the persuasive precedents of the Oglesby and
Griffith cases upon which to rely. Precedents from nine other stites49 should
give added sanction to the adoption of the Wisconsin view of the doctrine of
moral consideration.
Enforcement of these promises would instance the increasing tendency to
enforce promises seriously made.so The past benefit, in providing a reason for
the promise,Sy would serve to corroborate the existence of a contractual intent.
In so serving it would perform what Lord Wright regards as the primary function of consideration; namely, to provide a test of contractual intention.S2 If
protection of those in an unfavorable bargaining position is also a function of
consideration, s3 a past benefit will perform this function more effectively than
present consideration, for thereason that a pastbenefit sufficient to create a moral
obligation must be a substantial one, whereas equivalency is not required of a
48 Park

Falls State Bank v. Fordyce, 206 Wis. 628, 238 N.W. S16 (i93i).

49 Baker v. Gregory, 28 Ala. 544 (r856); Webb v. McGowin, 27 Ala. App. 82, i68 So. 196
(1936); Gray v. Hamil, 82 Ga. 375, 1o S.E. 205 (1889) (decided under Georgia Code); Drake
v. Bell, 26 N.Y. Misc. 237, 55 N.Y. Supp. 945 (x899); Doty v. Wilson, 14 Johns. (N.Y.) 378
(z8ii); Bentley v. Lamb, 112 Pa. 480,4 Atl. 200 (x886) (this was an extreme extension of the
doctrine of moral consideration, the court holding that the moral obligation arising from a
gratuitous promise was sufficient consideration to support a subsequent express promise); In
re Sutch's Estate, 201 Pa. 305, So Atl. 943 (i9o2); In re Phol's Estate, 7 A. (2d) 14 (Pa. Super.
Ct. 1939); Ferguson v. Harris, 39 S.C. 323, 17 S.E. 782 (1893); Edson v. Poppe, 24 S.D. 466,
124 N.W. 44i (I9io); Boothe v. Fitzpatrick, 36 Vt. 681 (1864); Olsen v. Hagen, 102 Wash.
321, 172 Pac. 1173 (I918); Park Falls State Bank v. Fordyce, 2o6 Wis. 628, 238 N.W. 5i6
(1932).
so Sharp, op. cit. supra note i; Some Aspects of the Law of Release of Claims in Illinois,

5 Univ. Chi. L. Rev. 455, 462 (1938); Ashley, Doctrine of Consideration,

26

Harv. L. Rev.

(1913); Uniform Written Obligations Act, 9 UniformL. Ann. 431 (932); Uniform Written
Obligations Act, 9 Uniform L. Ann. 245 (Supp. 1939). This act is discussed in Contracts
429

without Consideration; The Seal and the Uniform Written Obligations Act, 3 Univ. Chi. L.
Rev. 312 (1936).
51"The fact that the promisor has already received consideration for his promise before he

makes it, so far from enabling him to break his promise seems to us to form an additional
reason for making him keep it," Report of the English Law Revision Committee, op. cit.
supra note i, at 6o3.

52Wright, op. cit. supra note i. This view was held by Lord Mansfield, Pillans v. Van
Mierop, 3 Burr. 1664 (K.B. 1765).
S3Oliphant, Mutuality of Obligation in Bilateral Contracts at Law, 28 Col. L. Rev. 997
(1928); Univ. Chi. L. Rev., op. cit. supra note 5o; Col. L. Rev., op. cit. infra note 54.
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present consideration.54 Finally, enforcement of these promises would mitigate
the hardship resulting from the abolition in many states of the common law
effect of the seal. ss
B
An additional reason for enforcing these promises exists in cases in which
there is a risk of reliance by the promisee on the promise. Such a case is Lawrence
v. Oglesby,5 where a son promised his father to pay a share of his legacy over to
his sister. Thereafter, the father left his will unchanged. It is probable that his
failure to insert a provision for the sister was a consequence of his reliance on his
son's promise. In cases where the conduct is unequivocal reliance, some courts
in recognition of the "idea implicit in assumpsit that a recovery should be available to anyone who has, in a selected sense, been hurt by the promise of another
and his failure to fulfil it,"S7 have placed the risk of this reliance on the promi-

sor. 58 But in cases like Lawrence v. Oglesby the conduct, mere failure to act, is
equivocal, because of the apparent impossibility of ascertaining whether it was
by reason of reliance on the promise or because of some other reason that the
person refrained from certain conduct. As a result, the courts here, unable to
find actual reliance, refuse to place the risk of equivocal reliance on the promisor. This refusal, it is submitted, overlooks the fact that the inaction, although
not unequivocal reliance, is in many cases of such nature that "it cannot be
supposed that the connection between that inaction and the promise is wholly
unconscious."59 The protection of the promisee by placing the risk of this
equivocal reliance on the promisor in such cases would find adequate support in
the field of commercial law.
Examination of the commercial cases involving situations creating a risk of
reliance indicates the lengths to which the courts have gone to allocate the
burden of this risk to the promisor. The fact that the commercial law has advanced further in allocating the burden of this risk to the promisor is readily
explained. This field of law developed from the law merchant, the growth of
which was shaped almost entirely by considerations of business convenience.
Furthermore, it was the common man rather than the trained jurist who
guided the development of the law merchant. Morris C6hen contends that it is
the belief of common men that promises possess a sanctity which makes their
54 1 Williston, Contracts § 11s (rev. ed. i936); Rest., Contracts § 8r (1932). This doctrine
is questioned in The Peppercorn Theory of Consideration and the Doctrine of Fair Exchange
in Contract Law, 35 Col. L. Rev. iogo (1935).
ss ..... Certainly the abolition of the common law effect of the seal seems to leave defective the law of many American jurisdictions," Sharp, op. cit. supra note i, at 278.
56 178 Ill. 122, 52 N.E. 945 (1899).
57 Sharp, op. cit. supra note i, at 279.
55 Sharp, op. cit. supra note i, at 279; cf. Shattuck, Gratuitous Promises-A New Writ?, 35

Mich. L. Rev. 9o8 (1937).
s9 In re All Star Feature Co., 232 Fed. 1oo4 (D.C. N.Y. i9z6).
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breach unbearable. 6" This belief would naturally lead them to enforce promises
on a broader scale than did the casuists who developed the common law.
An instance of the risk of equivocal reliance is found in the cases in which a
debtor, pressed by his uneasy creditor for collateral security for a pre-existing
debt, negotiates a third person's demand note, or time note maturing before the
due date of the original debt, 6' to the creditor without any new consideration. It

is evident that the creditor, "being lulled into quiet,"' 2 will often rely on the
third person's note. He may delay suit against the debtor, during which time
the debtor might become insolvent; or he may neglect an opportunity to get a
mortgage or chattel pledge; or his feeling of security resulting from the acquisition of the new collateral may induce him to extend credit to the debtor or
others. In most cases, however, it would be impossible to prove that the creditor
would have acted differently had no collateral been furnished. The awareness
of the judges of the risk of this reliance was largely responsible for some of the
early decisions allocating the burden to the promisor by making the creditor a
holder for value, 63 even though it was difficult to find "value" in the traditional
6
meaning. 4
Difficulties arise, however, when a third person, rather than the debtor himself, furnishes collateral after the debt has been contracted by executing a demand note or a time note, maturing before the maturity date of the debt,
directly to the creditor without new consideration. The necessity of finding consideration to support the obligation of the third person as the immediate party
to the security transaction has rendered protection of the creditor difficult,5
even though he is just as likely to be lulled into a false security, and to fail to
pursue his rights as in the case where he is the endorsee of the note of the third
person.66
6o Cohen, The Basis of Contract, 46 Harv. L. Rev. 553 (1933).
6
1 When a time note, maturing after the maturity date of the debt, rather than a demand
note is given as collateral, the courts find consideration in an implied agreement to forbear
until the maturity date of the collateral.
62Manning v. McClure, 36 Ill.
490, 498 (i86S); Swift v. Tyson, i6 Pet. (U.S.) i (1842).
The collateral "stays the hand of the creditor," Leask v. Scott Bros., 2 Q.B.D. 376 (1877).
The collateral will have this effect whether it is a promise or a deed to land. A realization
of this has led the Uniform Laws Commission to suggest that a creditor who takes land or a
chattel as security for a precedent debt be protected as a holder for value, Commissioner's
Note, i Uniform L. Ann. 448, 449 (ig3i), discussed in Kennedy, "Value"-a Plea for Uniformity in New York Commercial Law, 8 St. John's L. Rev. 1 (i933).
63 Swift v. Tyson, x6 Pet. (U.S.) i (1842); Manning v. McClure, 36 Ill.
490 (i85).
64 Wickhem, Consideration and Value in Negotiable Instruments, 3 Wis. L. Rev. 321
(1926).

651, 4 Williston, Contracts §§ io8, 1146 (rev. ed. 1936); Story, Promissory Notes 218, n. 4

(5 th ed. i859); First Nat'l Bank of Poteau v. Allen, 88 Okla.

& Fisher Stores Co. v. Allen, 66 Colo. 83, I79 Pac.
72

Atl. 868 (i9o8).
66

Wickhem, op. cit. supra note 64.

152

162, 212

Pac. 597

(1923);

Daniels

(gIg); Gilbert v. Wilbur, io5 Me. 74,

NOTES

The recognition that there is the same need for protection in these cases as in
those where the collateral is negotiated to the creditor has led the courts to
create various devices to afford the creditor protection in spite of the lack of
consideration. This explains the readiness of some courts to dispense with the
necessity of consideration by finding a conditional delivery and an implied
agreement to furnish a surety, 7 or to find consideration in an implied agreement
to forbear,6 8 when the facts scarcely seem to justify such findings. One court has
gone so far as to hold, in a case of an unrequested but reasonable forbearance,
that "forbearance, even without an agreement to forbear, if it be completed,"
is sufficient consideration. 69 As early as 1568 it was said that where a person
requested the extension of credit, his subsequent suretyship promise was enforceable without any new consideration70
Some courts have avoided the necessity of finding consideration by relying
on technicalities to bring the creditor within the class of holders in due course.
Thus, in American National Bank v. Kerley,7z the court held that a payee, who
had received the instrument as collateral security through an intermediary who
was his own agent, was a holder in due course. The Illinois Supreme Court
adopted the same view with regard to a creditor to whom a "pay me" note had
been transferred by its maker.72 The courts, in each of these cases, managed to
overcome the difficulty of calling an immediate party, as such, a holder in due
course. However, in the Kerley case the court failed to consider the more troublesome question of whether the holder, knowing the operative facts which, if
pleaded, would constitute the defence of lack of consideration, can be a holder
in due course. Other courts, apparently without being aware of what they were
doing, have held the creditor to be a holder in due course without even a technicality to justify their holding.73 Another method of giving a creditor the protection that business needs require is accomplished by treating the delivery of
v. Holmes, 79 Mich. 43o, 44 N.W. 922 (i8go); Samson v. Thornton, 3 Met. (Mass.)
(184); Arant, Suretyship § 27, n. 37 ('93').

67Steers
275

68 Mohn v. Mohn, 18i Iowa ixg, z64N.W. 341 (1917); Johnson & Higgins v. Harper Trans-

portation Co.,
192

228

Fed. 730 (D.C. Mass. 1915); McDonald Bros. v. Koltes, 155 Minn.

24,

N.W. iog (1923).

69 In re All Star Feature Co., 232 Fed. ioo4 (D.C. N.Y. 1916). Contra: Strong v. Sheffield, x44 N.Y. 392, 39 N.E. 330 (i895).
70See Hunt v. Bate, 3 Dyer 272 (K.B. r568); Sidenham v. Worlington, 2 Leon. 224 (C.P.
1585); Laingor v. Lowenthal, 151 Ill. App. 599 (i909). Cf. Arant, Suretyship § 27 (931).
71io9 Ore. 155 , 199-203, 220 Pac. 1i6, 130, 131 (1923).
72Elgin

Nat'l Bank v. Goecke, 295 Ill. 403, 129 N.E. 149 (1920). This holding makes it

possible for two parties to avoid the necessity of furnishing consideration by merely having the
obligor make the note payable to himself and then endorse it to the other party.
73Many, Blanc and Co. v. Krueger, 153 Ill. App. 327 (1go); Thompson v. Franklin Nat'l
Bank, 45 App. D.C. 219 (i9x6); West Rutland Trust Co. v. Houston, 104 Vt. 204, 158 Adt.
69 (1931) (in this case there was an alternative ground for holding the person who furnished

the collateral).
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the note as a pledge.74 The pledge of one's paper, like the pledge of a chattel, is
an executed transaction rather than executory, so that consideration is not required. The simplest way to protect the creditor is to say, as did Lord Mansfield, that when the promise of the surety is reduced to writing there is no objection to the want of consideration because "a nudum pactum does not exist in the
law of merchants.""s This rule would obviate the necessity of relying on fictions
to enforce the promise of the surety, yet would not leave the surety unprotected, for the rules regarding mistake would give him the same protection that
the doctrine of consideration now affords him.
Another illustration of the risk of reliance problem is suggested by practices
connected with irrevocable letters of credit.76 In pursuance of a contract of sale,
the buyer arranges with a bank to issue an irrevocable letter of credit whereby
the bank agrees to honor all drafts of the seller up to a fixed amount. This assures the seller of the performance of the contract, and is a convenient credit
arrangement for the buyer. It is possible to find consideration in each situation
thus far appearing in the reports, in which the bank was or should have been
held liable upon the letter of credit. A sense of the limitations of consideration
doctrines, and of the danger that these doctrines will not give legitimate protection in every case of reliance or risk of reliance has, however, induced writers
and courts to suggest a general principle making letters of credit irrevocable
from the outset. Such a principle would, for example, protect the seller who has
simply made preparations to accept a buyer's offer against revocation of a promised credit secured by the buyer. It would indeed go further and protect the
seller from the time the promise in the letter is properly communicated to him,
without requiring him to prove that it has influenced his conduct. Such a principle would doubtless lead to a reconsideration of the buyer's power to revoke
his offer.
The commercial cases provide sufficient authority to warrant enforcement of
promises in the non-commercial cases where such enforcement is similarly necessary to afford protection against the risk of reliance. Where there is no risk of
reliance the desirability of allowing one to place himself under a legal obligation
to reimburse another for benefits conferred should be equally persuasive in leading the courts to adhere to the suggested liberal view of consideration.
74 Steffen explains the holding in West Rutland Trust Co. v. Houston, 104 Vt. 205, i58
Atl. 69 (1931) (cited note 73 supra) on this ground, even though the court does not speak of
the security transaction as a pledge, Steffen, Cases on Commercial and Investment Paper 654
(1939).

7s Pillans v. Van Mierop, 3 Burr. 1664 (K.B. 1765).
76 See Gutteridge, Bankers' Commercial Credits (1932); Thayer, Irrevocable Credits in
International Commerce: Their Legal Nature, 36 Col. L. Rev. io3i (1936); McCurdy, Commercial Letters of Credit, 35 Harv. L. Rev. 539 (1922); Davis, The Relationship between
Banker and Seller under a Confirmed Credit, 52 L. Q. Rev. 225 (1936); Letters of CreditNegotiable Instruments, 36 Yale L. J. 245 (1926).

